BENCHMARKING THE COSTS OF ONTARIO POWER DISTRIBUTORS: A Review of the Pacific Economics Group Report

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Presentation on behalf of the Electricity Distributors Association September 12-13, 2007 Benchmarking -- Introduction

Benchmarking is a common component of regulation. For example, it can be used to:

- set cost of capital and capital structure;
- set productivity factors and inflation factors in price-cap formulae;
- assess other performance indices e.g., service quality, reliability.

Benchmarking -- Introduction

 Incentive regulation leads away from detailed cost analysis by regulators.

 Proponents of cost benchmarking argue it is useful for

- 'rebasing' costs from time to time
- supplementing incentive regulation when 'incentives' are weak
- informing policy decisions e.g., on industry structure.

Benchmarking -- Methods

Methodologies for benchmarking costs and production.

Data envelopment analysis.

- Stochastic cost frontier estimation.
- Cost and production function estimation.

Index-based approaches.

Benchmarking – Estimation of Best Practices

- "Best-practice" methodologies:
 - data envelopment analysis
 - stochastic frontier estimation.
- In the present setting, these are of secondary interest principally because "best practices" are far more difficult to estimate accurately than average performance. <u>Much</u> more data would be required.

Benchmarking – Estimation of Best Practices

- Estimation of "best-practices" difficult to reconcile with "incentive regulation" which is premised in part on the idea that the regulator <u>cannot</u> estimate minimum costs especially accurately.
- A sensible alternative to estimation of "bestpractices" is estimation of say "best-quartile" performance. Regression techniques can be applied (in particular, quantile regression).

PEG Report

- Analysis focuses primarily on estimation of regression models and indexes for OM&A costs.
- Explanatory variables / Cost drivers:
 - Number of customers
 - Price of labour
 - Retail deliveries
 - Distribution line circuit kilometers
 - Percent forestation of rural service territory
 - Percent distribution plant underground
 - Canadian Shield (binary)
 - Non-contiguous service territory (binary)

PEG Report

- Very high R² approximately 98% of variation in OM&A costs explained by the variables in the model.
- This would suggest that the overwhelming majority of OM&A costs can be explained by observable factors included in the model.

PEG Report

- Based on model estimates, authors calculate cost performance scores which vary widely:
 - The "most efficient firms" have costs 30% below the level predicted by the models.
 - The "least efficient firms" have costs 40% above the level predicted by the model.

- Very high explanatory power of the estimated models would suggest that
 - a great deal is known about distributor costs;
 - costs can be predicted with a very high degree of accuracy given a small number of distributor characteristics.

These conclusions would be erroneous.

Over 95% of variation in total OM&A costs is explained by a single cost driver -- the "number of customers".



- If one uses "OM&A costs per customer" as the dependent variable, R² would be much lower.
- Differences in "OM&A costs per customer" are of greater practical interest because they are reflected in bills paid by customers.

- In a capital intensive industry such as electricity distribution, capital costs typically constitute the majority of total costs. These are excluded from the analysis.
- Omission of capital costs limits value and applicability of empirical results.

- age of distribution plant -- past analyses have found that aging distribution systems require increased OM&A expenditures;
- service quality differences in service offerings, service quality and reliability can materially affect costs;

- voltage levels for historic reasons, some distributors possess systems with a variety of voltage levels; this can have a significant impact on OM&A costs;
- customer mix distributor costs can be affected by the particular mix of residential, commercial and industrial customers that it serves.

- Report suggests "economies of scale are available over a wide range of output in Ontario". This conclusion is premature.
- Insufficient information provided as to the accuracy of the estimated scale effect.
- Moreover, scale economies in OM&A do not necessarily imply scale economies in total costs.

Conclusions and Recommendations Omission of Capital Variables

- To the extent that capital-related variables are absent from the analysis, the cost models that are estimated in the PEG report do not represent standard practice in the economics literature.
- Data on capital variables need to be developed and incorporated in the models.

Conclusions and Recommendations Skewing of Incentives

Focus on OM&A costs can lead to skewing of incentives within the regulatory process -distributors will have the incentive to increase capital costs in order to reduce OM&A costs. Conclusions and Recommendations Skewing of Incentives

Potential impacts –

- over-capitalization
- under-spending on OM&A
- sub-optimal decisions with respect to own/lease alternatives.

Conclusions and Recommendations Data Issues

- Omission of "age of capital stock" can influence performance scores of some utilities by more than 10%.
- In addition to capital variables, other important cost drivers need to be considered:
 - service quality
 - load factors
 - differing voltage levels
 - customer mix

Conclusions and Recommendations Data Issues

The "wage" variable used in the PEG study is a proxy. Insufficient information provided on how it was constructed.

Alternative wage data should be considered.

Conclusions and Recommendations Model Validation Issues

- The "double log" and "translog" specifications that have been estimated have a long and venerable history in the economics literature,
- However, much progress has been made since their inception.
- Additional evidence on the validity of the estimated models needs to be provided, both in the single and multiple equation settings.

- 1. Incentive issues:
 - a. impacts on incentives of focus on OM&A costs rather than on total (including capital) costs
 - b. rational incentive creation

- 2. Data issues:
 - a. capital related variables
 - b. wage variables
 - other cost drivers e.g., service quality, voltage levels, customer mix
 - d. accounting consistency

- 3. Modeling issues:
 - a. model specification
 - b. model validation
 - c. multi-equation modeling

- 4. Regulatory issues:
 - a. transparency / reproducibility of results
 - need for an efficient mechanism by which a utility with "unfavorable scores" can address cost issues without excessive regulatory burden for the utility or the Board.